The Timing of Managerial Responses to Fiscal Stress by Brien, Spencer T. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2021-06
The Timing of Managerial Responses to Fiscal Stress
Brien, Spencer T.; Eger, Robert J. III; Matkin, David S.T.
American Society for Public Administration
Brien, Spencer T., Robert J. Eger III, and David ST Matkin. "The Timing of Managerial
Responses to Fiscal Stress." Public Administration Review 81.3 (2021): 414-427.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/68424
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Research Article
414 Public Administration Review • May | June 2021
David S. T. Matkin
Abstract: Using 34 years of data from Florida counties, we examine the effect of multiple fiscal stressors on 
expenditures over time to test theoretical propositions in Charles Levine’s seminal study on cutback management. 
We demonstrate support for Levine’s stages model and his claims on linkages between the causes of fiscal stress and 
managerial responses. Specifically, unemployment levels produce differential effects by service area (e.g., human 
services bear the most significant share of the reductions), especially in relation to the persistence of the stressor. We 
cannot support the stages model with other stressor measures. We expand the literature to include county governments, 
enhancing the contemporary literature on local government fiscal stress.
Evidence for Practice
• Persistently high unemployment leads county governments to follow the stages model of cutback 
management, where governments first respond with across-the-board spending cuts and then proceed to 
targeted cuts as the stressor persists. Unemployment statistics are among the most accessible and comparable 
economic statistics, and government administrators would do well to carefully track local unemployment 
conditions.
• As fiscal stressors persist over time, the effects are not evenly distributed across government functions. This 
result means analysts should avoid using aggregate measures of government spending to track the effects of 
fiscal stressors.
• The findings demonstrate that county government responses are comparable with those observed in 
municipal governments (e.g., Hendrick 2011), suggesting generalizability in contemporary county 
management with other local governments.
Allocating scarce resources during times of fiscal1 stress is among the most controversial and vital decisions in public service. This 
allocation process engages diverse stakeholders, such 
as politicians, managers, and the constituents they 
serve, and it exposes core organizational priorities, 
pushes analytical and strategic capacities, and strains 
organizational morale and employees’ job satisfaction 
(Levine 1984).
As demonstrated during the 2007–2009 U.S. 
national recession, even well-managed governments 
are likely to go through periods of fiscal stress 
and have difficulty balancing their budgets. As 
an initial response, governments may attempt to 
alleviate fiscal stress by seeking additional revenues, 
a strategy that is often politically infeasible (Carr, 
Elling, and Krawczyk 2010; Finegold, Schardin, 
and Steinbach 2003; Shubik, Horwitz, and 
Ginsberg 2009). Even if there is sufficient political 
support to increase taxes, fees, or charges, the process 
to approve and collect additional revenues is often 
too time-consuming to satisfy current financial needs 
(Hoene and Pagano 2010). External support from 
intergovernmental grants may be too little and too 
late, due to lengthy application processes. Therefore, 
to balance their budgets, public managers are often 
compelled to reduce budgetary support for current 
public services.
Of course, decreasing current services creates 
significant challenges (Bozeman and Allen 
Slusher 1979; Glassberg 1978; Levine 1979). For 
example, it is not always clear which service areas 
are already operating close to maximum efficiency, 
where decreasing support may be particularly 
harmful. Public employees (e.g., public safety workers, 
librarians, and school teachers) and constituents of 
public services (e.g., participants in local recreation 
programs and parents of special-needs children) 
regularly lobby government officials to protect their 
services from decreases. Government practitioners 
may respond to these constraints by imposing across-
the-board reductions that affect all city services 
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on a somewhat equal basis (Hendrick 1989). Others target their 
decreases toward specific programs and services, focusing reductions 
on individual departments and agencies to the benefit of others 
(Hendrick and Garand 1991; Bordeaux 2016).
For several decades, Levine’s (1978) stages model has profoundly 
influenced our understanding of the effects of fiscal stress on 
public management. Yet, there is little empirical research into 
the progression of governments through those stages. Also, while 
Levine (1978) typologizes the sources of stress and anticipates 
those sources will affect management responses, little is known 
about how different fiscal stressors influence progression through 
the stages. In addition, while many studies examine the effects of 
fiscal stress, most focus on those effects through a single downturn. 
This approach risks identifying idiosyncratic and unreliable effects. 
Given the extent to which recent American recessions increased 
fiscal constraints on governments, it is practically and conceptually 
important to improve our understanding of which services bear the 
most significant share of decreases and which services are mostly 
unaffected. In short, we ask how fiscal stressors affect service 
changes over time.
This study makes three key contributions to the literature. First, we 
add to the literature on service delivery and cutback management by 
examining how different types of government services are affected 
by fiscal stress, including the timing of expenditure decreases and 
the persistence of decreased expenditure levels. Prior research, 
such as Hendrick (2011), looks at municipal governments and the 
events impacting fiscal change and increasing fiscal stress. From 
this municipal and metropolitan research, we generally know that 
in economic downturns, municipal practitioners draw down on 
rainy day funds, refinance debt, shift revenues, and expenditures 
across fiscal years (Finegold, Schardin, and Steinbach 2003), and 
seek alternative funding (Wen et al. 2020). However, we know little 
about the duration of fiscal effects or the types of services most 
affected.
Second, by drawing on a balanced panel of annual government 
spending over a 34-year period, this study provides the most 
comprehensive test of Levine’s stages model. A key tenant in Levine’s 
work is the expectation that different sources of fiscal stress produce 
different types of responses. By examining data over 34 years, we 
can measure effects that are consistent over multiple events of fiscal 
stress.
Third, we focus on counties due to their changing role in 
contemporary service provision, advancing the current literature 
on county behavior. Early research perceived counties primarily as 
the administrative arms of the states (Benton 2002; Menzel 1996), 
implying that counties are lesser versions of local governments, 
providing only the necessities of society. Since the call for expanded 
research on counties (Benton et al. 2007), the literature has begun 
to look at counties in a different light. Our new impression of 
counties views them as fully functional units charged with providing 
the expected amenities defined by their citizenry (Farmer 2018). 
Because of the expanding responsibilities and service complexities 
of US counties, this study provides insights into an understudied 
government unit of growing practical importance while presenting 
results that are generalizable to other local governments.
Adding to prior research, we ask how fiscal stressors affect the rate 
of fiscal change over time in county governments. How persistent 
are the effects of fiscal stress on county services spending? To 
address these questions, we use 34 years of annual data from 
Florida counties to examine the impact of fiscal stressors on service 
expenditures. The results demonstrate the relative influence of 
various types of fiscal stressors on service spending and provide 
evidence of trade-offs in county governments.
This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we articulate 
and present our hypothesized relationships. Following that, we 
specify our methodology, data, and method. We continue with the 
presentation of our results. The article concludes with a discussion 
of our key findings.
Hypothesis Development
Levine’s (1978) seminal article on cutback management presents 
a theoretical stages model of organizational decline. Following 
Levine (1978), researchers began to model managerial responses to 
fiscal stress as a function of those stages. Notably, Levine, Rubin, 
and Wolohojian (1981) presented a three-stage model that starts 
with delay tactics, followed by stretching out remaining resources, 
and then transitions into cutting and smoothing spending. 
Similarly, Wolman (1980) developed a 5-part model that similarly 
begins with delay tactics and then specifies two stages of revenue-
seeking behavior—first from the state government and then from 
own-source revenues. The Wolman model then progresses to 
spending cuts that are implemented initially across the organization 
but eventually becomes more targeted and focused on restructuring 
the budget to spending priorities. Both models describe managerial 
retrenchment strategies as a progression from resistance to 
restructuring.
Empirical efforts to quantify how closely administrators follow 
these stages have been limited and have yielded mixed results. 
Hendrick (2011) finds that local governments have first, second, 
third, and last resorts for managing fiscal stress and that the order 
of operations follows Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian (1981). 
According to Hendrick (2011), local governments start with the 
slightest disruptive tools for adapting to fiscal threats and then 
move toward more disruptive decisions as the threat increases or 
continues. Dougherty and Klase (2009) found evidence supporting 
the stages model in their analysis of state budgetary policies. Their 
results suggest states shifted from across-the-board cuts to more 
targeted restructuring as the duration of fiscal stress increased.
Studies critical of these stages’ models include Bartle (1995), who 
rejects the sequence of strategies predicted by Levine, Rubin, and 
Wolohojian (1981) and instead finds responses to fiscal stress to be a 
characteristic of local conditions. Others critical of the stages models 
have integrated surveys with fiscal indicators. Morgan and Pammer 
Jr (1988) interviewed local officials on their responses to budgetary 
pressure and compared their answers to their governments’ actual 
debt burden ratio’s change over the prior seven years. Their 
approach relies on the respondent’s memories of the strategies 
used, and it cannot address how managerial strategies changed as 
the severity and duration of the stressor evolved. The approach of 
asking managers about their managerial responses to fiscal stress was 
challenged by Maher and Deller’s (2007) finding that local officials’ 
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perceptions of the severity of fiscal stress are widely divergent from 
quantitative indicators of their cities’ fiscal condition. If managers’ 
memories of the degree of fiscal stress were worse than their 
government’s objective fiscal condition, then managers’ statements 
about what strategies they adopted would not be tied to a given level 
of organizational decline.
Given the opportunity for strategic responses, we follow 
Levine (1978) and Hendrick (2011) hypothesizing that:
Hypothesis 1: Early after the onset of a fiscal stressor, 
managers will perform across-the-board spending cuts.
According to Bartle (1995) and Dougherty and Klase (2009), 
misalignment with public manager behaviors may occur due to 
a relatively short time-period of analysis. Identifying patterns of 
strategic behavior may require observing the same public entities 
pass through multiple events of fiscal stress of varying duration 
and severity. A longer time horizon to enable comparison of fiscal 
behavior before and after the fiscal stress arises.
Current work has tried to illuminate the issue of managerial 
behavior as a function of time. López-Hernández et al. (2018) use 
survival analysis to examine how fiscal pressures influence local 
government outsourcing. They study 11 years surrounding the Great 
Recession (2000–2010) and estimate the impact of fiscal stressors 
on the outsourcing decision while controlling for the passage of 
time. González-Gómez and Guardiola (2009) examine Spanish 
municipalities’ outsourcing behavior following a national law change 
that permitted contracting out for water management services. 
Their duration model measures how the passage of time since the 
legal change affects the adoption of an outsourcing strategy. Wang 
and Peng (2018) employ event history analysis to examine 81 state 
pension plans over 14 years. While their study is not focused on 
fiscal stress responses, their methodology allows them to investigate 
shifts in strategy over time. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Extended durations of a stressor will eventually 
induce targeted budgetary restructuring.
The legal environment may constrain the selection of a decreasing 
funding strategy at the state and local level. Justice and Yang (2018) 
present a theoretical framework to describe how laws such as tax 
and expenditure limitations may limit the strategic choices available 
to local officials when confronted with fiscal stress. Some forms of 
local government, particularly counties, are required by the state 
to provide certain services, such as the sheriff and jail components 
of public safety. Other county services, such as parks and other 
amenities, are locally determined. The interaction between state 
service requirements and budgetary restructuring strategies should 
create a pattern of targeted cuts that protect mandated services, 
leading us to hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: Targeted spending cuts will protect state-
mandated spending at the expense of locally determined 
services.
Some spending areas, such as transportation, are centered on 
maintaining capital infrastructure, such as filling potholes on local 
roads. Support of these assets is costly, and deferring maintenance 
is a relatively easy way to push spending to the future and mitigate 
current fiscal pressure. Following this intuition, we predict that 
capital intensive spending areas will experience earlier spending 
reductions than other services. However, a confounding factor 
for this deferral hypothesis is that countercyclical spending 
often targets infrastructure as it is perceived to be a quick way to 
create construction jobs. Federal grants, such as those that came 
through the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, 
were predominantly targeted to infrastructure and “shovel-ready” 
projects. This leads us to hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Easily deferred service areas will experience 
more immediate cuts.
These hypotheses are tested by comparing budget cuts to individual 
expenditure categories to overall spending levels before, during, and 
after fiscal stress periods. If a spending cut is truly across-the-board, 
then reducing each spending category will be comparable to the 
change in total spending. If spending starts across the board and 
then begins to diverge to a more concentrated pattern of cuts as the 
duration of the stressor increases, the pattern of cuts is consistent 
with a progression in spending reduction strategies.
Methodology
This study examines expenditure changes and how those changes 
are affected by Levine’s (1978) typology of four contributors 
to the organization’s decline, which Hendrick (2011) supports: 
political vulnerability, environmental entropy, problem depletion, 
and organizational atrophy. Describing erosion in a community’s 
economic base that threatens the government’s ability to maintain a 
given level of public services is the pressure of environmental entropy. 
Levine gives the decline of manufacturing in the Midwest as an 
example of this type of stress. Political vulnerability describes an 
organization’s inability to resist resource transfer to other competing 
agencies or organizations. Cuts to state aid, used by Bartle (1995) 
as a measure of fiscal stress, reflects a relatively low priority for local 
services within the hierarchy of state fiscal policy. A prediction 
accompanied Levine’s typology that the source of organizational 
decline will influence the choice of the response strategy. Testing 
the other two elements of Levine’s typology, problem depletion, and 
organizational atrophy, is outside the scope of this paper but should 
be the topic of future studies before the literature can definitively 
assess the validity of the stages-of-retrenchment model.
Dependent Variable
We use the change from year t and year t − 1 in spending per 
capita to measure spending changes. We examine six categories of 
county spending in this analysis. Administrative spending includes 
all legislative, executive, and judicial services. Judicial Services 
include all administration of the county court system. Public Safety 
spending consists of all law enforcement, detention and correction, 
fire control, and ambulance and rescue services, as well as the 
county court system. County utilities, waste disposal, flood control, 
and other environmental protection services encompass Physical 
Environment spending. Transportation spending includes road and 
street maintenance, the operation of county airports and parking 
facilities, and county transit system operation. Human Services 
spans the operation of all county hospitals, physical and mental 
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health services, and other county welfare services. Aggregating all 
the preceding categories in addition to other operational spending 
on Culture/Recreation and Economic Development composes the 
final category. These categories reflect all the spending categories 
used by local governments in Florida. All dollars are adjusted to 
constant 1983–1984 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) consumer price index.
Fiscal Stressors
We inform our measures of fiscal stress using the work of 
Kodrzycki’s (1998) and Zullo’s (2009), studies of the relationship 
between fiscal stress and privatization. They operationalize 
fiscal stress using the ratio of budget surplus (deficit) to local 
expenditures, the ratio of debt-related expenditures to total 
revenues, and the local unemployment rate as a measure of the 
regional economy’s health. The use of unemployment rates is similar 
to Pierse and McHale (2019), who use unemployment rates in local 
jurisdictions to assess the duration of spells of unemployment. Using 
data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we calculate 
these measures for each county over the period of our analysis. 
Additionally, we measure reductions in intergovernmental revenues 
as an additional measure of organizational decline representing 
state and federal reprioritization of local spending during economic 
downturns.
We focus on the impact of extended periods of relatively high fiscal 
stress. Rather than incorporating each measure of stress in absolute 
terms, we measure each county’s relative position to its long-run 
average across our 32-year period. We define relatively high fiscal 
stress as having a stress indicator value greater than one standard 
error above the individual county mean. This measure allows the 
relative definition of stress to vary across counties but is consistent 
within counties over time.
We seek to measure the influence of rules-in-use by controlling 
for Florida property tax limitations. The state of Florida 
has implemented two types of property tax rate caps. The 
first dates back to 1968 when the state amended the Florida 
Constitution to limit property tax millage rates to 10 mills for 
counties, municipalities, and school districts (Florida Budget 
Subcommittee on Finance and Tax 2011). Florida implemented 
a second property tax rate limitation in 2007. This limit uses 
the concept of a “rolled-back” property tax rate to regulate the 
growth of property taxes over time. The rolled-back rate refers 
to the property tax rate that, when applied to the current year’s 
property tax base, would generate the same amount of revenue 
as if the maximum rate was applied in the previous year. Florida 
Statutes section 200.065(5) defines the current year’s maximum 
rate to be 110 percent of the rolled-back rate and an adjustment 
for per-capita income growth (Florida Statutes 2017). We use an 
indicator variable (ATCAP) to denote whether the county-year 
observation’s adopted property tax rate is at the maximum tax 
rate. We note that local governments can adopt rates that exceed 
either of the two millage rate limitations. Doing so requires one 
of two conditions: a county referendum or a supermajority vote 
from the county board.
Choosing to adopt a millage rate at the cap is an important 
indicator of the institutional constraints that bind the local fiscal 
policy. Tax limitations represent intergovernmental regulations that 
limit the options available to local government practitioners during 
periods of fiscal stress. Local governments at the rate limitations 
may exhibit different fiscal responses than those with room to 
generate additional own-source revenue.
Controls
We include three controls for county fiscal characteristics. The 
income per capita represents a local demand for public spending. 
Intergovernmental revenue per capita measures external aid that 
would also support county expenditures. The third economic 
control measures the tax burden. The tax burden measure is the 
ratio of income per capita to general revenue per capita. We remove 
all county-level fixed effects from the analysis by taking the first 
differences of the estimating equation. Table 1 provides descriptions 
of each variable used in the analysis. Table 2 contains summary 
statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
Table 1 Variable Descriptions
Variable Name Description
Dependent variables
Total Spending on aggregate general expenditures per capita
Admin Spending on administration services per capita
Safety Spending on public safety services per capita
Physical Spending on physical environment services per capita
Human Spending on health and human services per capita
Transp Spending on transportation services per capita
Explanatory variables
Uncount The number of consecutive years that a county has experienced unemployment more than one standard deviation above its 
average across the time series.
Debtcount The number of consecutive years that a county has experienced a debt ratio higher than one standard deviation above its 
average across the time series.
IGRcount The number of consecutive years that a county has experienced intergovernmental revenues more than one standard deviation 
below its average across the time series.
NETcount The number of consecutive years that a county has experienced net income more than one standard deviation below its average 
across the time series.
INCcap Personal income per capita
IGRcap Intergovernmental revenue per capita
Taxburden The ratio of income per capita and general revenue per capita
Notes: All dollars are normalized using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (1982–1984 = 100).
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Data
To examine the effect of fiscal stressors on county spending changes, 
we collect financial, economic, and demographic data on 66 of 
the 67 counties in Florida from 1979 to 2014. We find that Duval 
County’s data reporting is inconsistent, rendering this single county 
data unusable for the analysis. The unit of analysis is the county.
We examine spending changes in counties because counties tend 
to have strict balanced-budget requirements, have diverse service 
delivery demands, perform similar kinds of services, and have 
limited revenue sources that are likely to make trade-offs particularly 
common, thereby having a direct effect on service delivery.
The contemporary literature has begun to investigate the 
importance of county governments, outside of the administrative 
arms of state governments. In contrast to conventional fiscal 
federalism theory, which argues the local government is the 
developmental state, Xu and Warner (2016) find increased 
spatial inequality as expenditures driven by county needs crowd 
out expenditures related to county growth and development. 
Nonmetropolitan counties and older suburbs exhibit higher local 
effort, while outlying suburban areas have lower effort. Curtis et 
al. (2019) show how housing and community development and 
parks and recreation expenditures decrease county low birth weight 
incidences. They show that the effects of these improvements in 
maternal health, in preconception and prenatal periods, are through 
enhanced physical activity and social interaction mechanisms. 
Deslatte (2017) looks at county government land-use-planning. 
He observes that county modernization escalates the flexibility for 
elected officials to increase their ability to promote development 
interests as they confront growth.
Research on politics and political impacts has advanced our 
knowledge of county behavior. Choi et al. (2010) demonstrate that 
politics matters more at the county than at the municipal level. Choi 
et al. (2010) find a consistent positive relationship between voting 
for Democratic candidates at both the presidential and gubernatorial 
levels, total spending, and expenditures in allocative, developmental, 
and redistributive policy arenas. Park (2014) finds that California 
counties’ primary impacts are by the state’s leadership, financial 
support from other governments, and county residents’ political/
ideological preferences. Park (2014) implies that counties with 
more supporters for Democratic presidential candidates are likely 
to spend more on welfare services. Pink-Harper (2018) finds that 
the form of county government, as measured by having a county 
manager, has only a marginal impact on county economic growth 
and development trends in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Alabama, and 
Washington, the states under study.
While this research has provided information on counties’ policy 
and political impacts, other research on counties is about fiscal 
behavior. In Bernick et al. (2014), the transparency of county 
governments is assessed based on financial information available 
on the county’s website. Wang (2011) studies two environmental 
funding areas in county government: funding to protect the 
environment and funding to develop the environment. Counties 
with higher levels of manufacturing and farming activity spend 
more to protect the environment, while counties with higher 
population densities spend more to develop the environment. 
Wang (2011) shows that environmental spending in counties results 
from environmental pressure and budgetary politics.
Counties are also a relevant unit of analysis because they are 
relatively poorly studied despite their growing service responsibilities 
and complexities. The relative scarcity of county-level research, 
combined with the traditional view of counties as an administrative-
extension of state government, means there is little guidance in 
applying studies of state and local governments to counties—the 
fiscal stress literature is a clear example.
Our concentration on county governments within a single state 
is due to the necessity that government expenditures are classified 
uniformly. The Florida Department of Revenue requires local 
governments to complete a standardized annual report of their 
revenues and expenses, which is audited and revised. Though 
errors are likely to exist still, the reporting and classifications are 
reasonably reliable and valid.
Findings
Our first set of results estimate the persistence of the effect of fiscal 
stressors on Florida county spending. The results in Table 3 present 
our analysis of the high-unemployment stressor (i.e., environmental 
entropy). The appendix contains the GMM instrumentation 
process used. The columns of Table 3 depict the marginal effects for 
each of the six expenditure categories. We take the natural log of all 
continuous variables for ease of discussion.
Table 2 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Total 422.19 198.90 114.76 1,680.02
Admin 103.84 46.79 19.81 452.73
Safety 142.40 79.35 8.20 856.92
Human 26.53 43.50 0.00 711.31
Physical 29.42 41.89 0.00 590.83
Transp 79.35 53.53 0.00 752.73
Uncount 1.35 2.25 0 16
Debtcount 1.14 2.26 0 14
IGRcount 3.85 5.29 0 22
Netcount 1.24 2.04 0 18
Netratio 8.06 14.70 −55.73 101.02
INCcap 13,348 4,400.24 5,623 33,748
IGRcap 119.69 74.23 23.95 814.63
Taxburden 33.38 12.74 8.37 87.50
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Our results, shown in Table 3, indicate that increases in the 
persistence of high unemployment harm all county spending 
categories, except for the physical environment, for the first three 
years. The impact of high unemployment is diminishing over 
time, a theoretically intuitive result given that administrators 
would likely address the effects. To understand the impact of high 
unemployment over time, we exponentiate the marginal coefficient 
to adjust for our count variable, a technically more accurate result. 
The first row of Table 3 shows high unemployment reduces total 
spending by (exp [−0.018]-1) × 100 = 1.78 percent. This effect 
continues on total spending for four years, albeit at a diminishing 
rate per year.
We see a different effect on the physical environment, with spending 
increasing for the first year of high unemployment. Initially, we 
conjecture this outcome may be due to the administrator’s abilities 
to influence fixed costs, like those associated with utilities, waste 
disposal, and flood control. We performed sensitivity testing to 
examine why the coefficient on the physical environment might 
take this positive sign, revealing that the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is the primary driver. Human services 
outcomes are somewhat troubling with the persistence of high 
unemployment. In the first year of high unemployment, there is no 
statistical effect of high unemployment on human services spending. 
After this first year, human services see a decrease in spending 
that is increasing over time. This resulting decrease in spending 
differs from all other categories of spending. It appears that human 
services, such as county hospitals, physical and mental health 
services, and other welfare services, are impacted after the first 
year of high unemployment, and do not recover from that effect 
during the next years of high unemployment. The result tells us that 
public administrators find it very difficult to spare human services 
spending when high unemployment persists.
Putting our results in the context of our hypothesized relationships, 
we find that high unemployment appears to be reacted on by 
managers in across-the-board cuts. We find evidence of a direct 
connection of managers reducing total, administrative, public safety, 
and transportation spending. At the same time, human services 
spending has the correct sign associated with a reduction, and, 
due to ARRA, physical environment services spending increases. If 
we argue that early-onset encompasses two years, we find general 
support for hypothesis 1, except for physical environment spending. 
Our results support Levine’s (1978) work and the empirical work of 
Hendrick (2011), with an exception noted for physical environment 
spending.
Looking at hypothesis 2, our results from the persistence of high 
unemployment show that the longer we observe the stressor, the 
more focused or targeted the reduction in spending. This reduction 
becomes quite apparent when we see the stressor lasting more 
than three periods. We recognize that with high unemployment 
continuing into year 4, only public safety and human services 
show reduced spending. When we observe the fifth period of 
high unemployment, only human services are directly affected. 
We conclude that we have support for hypothesis 2 for the high-
unemployment stressor.
Our estimates for high employment show little support for 
hypothesis 3. The spending cuts associated with either instant or 
perpetual high unemployment do not spare public safety or human 
services from reduced spending. Both of these spending categories 
contain constitutionally required services. Thus, for our stressor, 
high unemployment, we reject hypothesis 3. Putting our attention 
on hypothesis 4, we find partial support for the deferral of services 
when looking at the high-unemployment stressor. We observe a 
reduction in spending on transportation services. However, we find 
the impact of ARRA on the physical environment, countercyclical 
spending by the federal government as a confounding factor that 
reduces the effect of deferred service spending.
We offer a complement to our tabular measures for the persistence 
of unemployment by looking at a graphical analysis. Figure 1 
presents a series of lines illustrating the percent change in spending 
per capita that occurs for each year following a shock to county 
unemployment. Differences in the size of the lagged dependent 
variable’s estimate affect how quickly these effects taper off.
Examining the high-debt-ratio stressor in Table 4 offers a different 
story than our estimates of high unemployment. We show that 
multiple years of a high debt ratio affects only total spending, 
finding no impact on the individual spending categories. The 
influence on total spending is a reduction of 1.12 percent in the first 
year of a high debt ratio. The result of total spending falls to 0.73 
Table 3 Marginal Effects of High Unemployment
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




One year of high unemployment −0.018*** −0.008* −0.011** 0.028* −0.013 −0.032***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
Two years −0.015*** −0.006* −0.008** 0.020 −0.018** −0.022***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
Three years −0.012*** −0.005 −0.006*** 0.011 −0.024** −0.012**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005)
Four years −0.009*** −0.003 −0.004** 0.002 −0.029** −0.0013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008)
Five years −0.006 −0.002 −0.002 −0.006 −0.035* 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011)
Observations 2,217 2,217 2,217 2,212 2,209 2,214
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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percent when experiencing a high debt ratio for two consecutive 
years. The shock on total spending becomes insignificant when the 
high debt ratio persists for a third year, allowing us to hypothesize 
that county administrators manage the effect of a high debt ratio 
on overall spending while removing the temptation to affect the 
individual spending categories.
Putting the results of a high debt ratio in the context of our 
hypothesized relationships, we see that a high debt ratio appears to 
be comparatively ignored by county managers in across-the-board 
cuts. We find little evidence of a direct connection between spending 
categories and a high debt ratio. We conclude that county managers do 
not respond to individual spending categories when the high-debt-ratio 
stressor is observed. The implication leads us to reject hypothesis 1, 
that across-the-board cuts accompany the high-debt-ratio stressor.
Investigating hypothesis 2, the persistence of a high debt ratio 
disappears within the individual spending categories. These results 
lead us to reject hypothesis 2 regarding the role of a high debt 
ratio. Our estimates for a high debt ratio show no support for 
hypothesis 3. The spending cuts associated with either an instant 
or constant high debt ratio spare all individual services from 
reductions in spending. Turning our attention to hypothesis 4, we 
find no support for the deferral of services, thereby rejecting this 
hypothesized relationship.
Using the complementary graphical presentation for the high 
debt ratio (Figure 2), we observe the total spending effects. 
Although the graphical display for high debt ratio indicates 
the adverse effects on administrative, public safety, and 
transportation spending, none of these effects are statistically 
supported (Table 5).
When looking at low intergovernmental revenue as a fiscal 
stressor, we see that as time increases, the sign on total spending 
persists. Although total spending is statistically inconsequential, 
both administrative and public safety spending is statistically 
significant for the periods, albeit with the incorrect sign for our 
hypotheses. We reject all of our hypothesized relationships for the 
low intergovernmental revenue stressor. Graphically, Figure 3, 
and in our tabular analysis, the statistically supported effects of 
administrative and public safety spending are the opposite sign 
of our hypothesized relationships. This counterintuitive outcome 
may be explainable. Let us consider the outcome of administrative 
expenditures. As intergovernmental revenue continues to decline, 
county governments increase spending throughout the period, 
although the effect is diminishing. It may be that counties are 
growing administrative spending to seek alternative revenue 
sourcing, thereby increasing spending since intergovernmental 
revenue is in decline, and county administrators are looking for an 
alternative revenue source.
Regarding the outcome of public safety spending, spending 
is increasing at a decreasing rate after the first year of 
intergovernmental revenue decline. This outcome suggests a 
substitution effect of county funds for intergovernmental revenue. 
Priority to constitutionally required public safety, once supported 
by intergovernmental revenue, continues within the county. County 
administrators substitute county funds since intergovernmental 
resources are dwindling.
The results presented in Table 6 and Figure 4 show our last 
fiscal stressor, low net income per capita. The outcomes show 
that we should reject all of our hypothesized relationships, given 
both the sign and statistical significance of the marginal effects. 
Although the findings are the opposite of those hypothesized, 
increases in spending are differentiable across categories. Spending 
on the physical environment is the largest in magnitude, while 
expenditures for human services has the smallest impact.
Table 4 Marginal Effects of High Debt Ratio
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




One year of high debt ratio −0.011** −0.005 −0.006 0.007 −0.009 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.023) (0.012) (0.009)
Two years −0.007** −0.003 −0.002 0.0002 −0.007 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.018) (0.009) (0.007)
Three years −0.003 0.0004 0.002 −0.006 −0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
Four years 0.0004 0.003 0.006 −0.013 −0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006)
Five years 0.004 0.006 0.010** −0.019 0.0006 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Figure 1 Cumulative Effect of Extended Periods of High 
Unemployment
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Table 5 Marginal Effects of Low Intergovernmental Revenue
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Spending Administrative Public Safety Physical Environment Human Services Transportation
One year of low IGR −0.003 0.012*** 0.008* 0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.005)
Two years −0.002 0.011*** 0.008* 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005)
Three years −0.002 0.009*** 0.008** 0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004)
Four years −0.001 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003)
Five years −0.0004 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
The literature on fiscal stress indicates that we should see a negative 
sign on the marginal effects, but we see positive outcomes. Why 
would this result occur? One explanation would be that our measure 
for low net income is inadequate. If that was the case, it seems like 
we would not observe such robust outcomes. Alternatively, county 
administrators, seeing a persistent decline in net income per capita, 
increase their spending across the board, assuring a welfare net 
is in place during economic downturns. This latter explanation 
seems to fit the role of counties in the literature where counties 
are complements to state governments. Although fiscal federalism 
suggests that the provision of welfare nets are best at the state 
or federal level, local governments play a substantial part in the 
financing and execution of social welfare policy (Gillette 2011).
Craw (2010) argues that the federal and state governments have 
increasingly devolved accountability to local governments for 
social welfare policy. An example is that since the enactment of 
federal welfare reform in the late 1990s, 40 percent of states have 
broadened local autonomy and responsibility for public welfare 
policy (Gainsborough 2003).
Our final results discussion concerns our control variables offered 
in Table 7. We find that our control variable for income, the log 
of real income per capita, is consistently positive and significant 
for total spending and the two individual spending categories 
of administrative and public safety, an expected result. We find 
mixed results for the log of real income per capita for the physical 
environment and consistent insignificant results for transportation 
spending. Our control for tax burden, the log of the tax burden, is 
consistently negative and significant across all spending categories 
regardless of the fiscal stressor under evaluation. Our final control, 
the log of intergovernmental revenue per capita, is reliably positive 
for total spending; however, it has mixed results for each of the 
individual spending categories and the accompanying fiscal stressor.
Conclusion
The importance of understanding management’s use of financial 
resources to induce the stability and performance of public 
organizations is an essential aspect of public administration. Adding 
to this needed literature, we examine a panel of county governments 
to understand how the persistence of fiscal stressors, such as 
unemployment, debt, intergovernmental revenue, and per capita 
income, affect expenditures in service-function categories.
Our efforts illustrate that persistent unemployment induces stage-
like behaviors found in Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian (1981) and 
Hendrick (2011). Using multiperiod shocks, county administrators 
begin with virtually across-the-board reductions in spending. 
The first year of exposure to fiscal stressors appears to support the 
expectation that government practitioners prefer across-the-board 
decreases to virtually all service-function categories. They then, after 
approximately three periods, focus on targeted drops as the stressor 
continues. We see that as fiscal stressors persist beyond the first year, 
the cumulative effects are disproportionately borne by health and 
human service functions. This finding introduces a prioritization for 
financial practices during persistent fiscal scarcity as we observe that 
health and human service functions become the focus of reduced 
spending. Our outcome for unemployment leads us to question 
the utility of aggregate spending data to understand the effects of 
financial resources on specific types of public services. We question 
aggregated approaches, particularly under conditions of persistent 
fiscal scarcity.
When we look at other fiscal stressors, we find a minimal response 
from county managers when faced with high debt ratios. We 
observe that total spending does decrease under this fiscal stress, 
the only significant category of expenditures. This effect lasts two 
periods, and it loses significance. We observe that county managers’ 
Figure 2 Cumulative Effect of Extended Periods of High Debt 
Ratio
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responses are mute when the stressor high debt ratio is observed at 
the individual spending category. This response to the high debt 
ratio is in opposition to the contemporary literature assumption that 
high levels of public debt threaten the fiscal health of a government 
(as an example, see Liu, Moldogaziev, and Mikesell 2017). Long-
term claims on available local government resources may not 
reduce the opportunity for supporting important individual service 
demands, given our outcomes.
Our results show that multiple periods of intergovernmental 
reductions impact both administrative and public safety spending 
in a positive way. Although this is the opposite of our hypothesized 
relationship, one explanation is that managers put more emphasis 
on these two categories by seeking alternative funds to substitute for 
this revenue loss while attending to county-level safety.
We show a robust differential effect on spending activity when 
counties are under the stressor, low net income per capita. This 
outcome introduces an interesting paradox. As low per capita 
income persists, all spending categories see an increase in spending, 
the opposite of our hypothesized relationships. This spending 
continues to increase at a decreasing rate through the third period 
of low net income per capita. After the third period, we observe 
a targeted managerial approach where total, administrative, and 
public safety spending continue to increase at a decreasing rate. 
In contrast, the physical environment, human services, and 
transportation spending are statistically unchanged, providing 
support for hypothesis 2, but in a counterintuitive way.
Our results imply impacts on practice. Our results may indicate 
a “best practices” empirical outcome for county managers under 
the stressor of high unemployment. The results indicate that in 
the first year of high unemployment, practitioners use a common 
tool—across-the-board reductions in spending—and apply this 
tool to the vast majority of offered services, the exception being 
human services. We see that after using this tool, practitioners turn 
to a targeted approach, that is, reductions that are now minimal 
in specific services and increasing in others. We find that cuts to 
administrative, public safety, and transportation fall compared 
to the first incremental cuts, while human services begin to see 
increasing cutbacks. By year three, human services absorb the most 
substantial decrease, an increase of 33 percent over year two, while 
administrative services are no longer a statistically significant cut. In 
year three, public safety reductions have fallen by about 25 percent 
from the prior year’s cuts, physical service cuts are not statistically 
different than zero, and transportation cuts have fallen by about 
45 percent compared to cuts in year two. By year five, the only 
expenditure cuts are to human services, which have again increased 
by about 20 percent compared to year four. All other services are 
spared expenditure cuts. These outcomes indicate that human 
services, which has the smallest average expenditure across counties, 
absorbs the largest cuts after being spared cuts in the first year 
of fiscal stress. Our outcomes indicate that services over time are 
treated differently, leading to a stages process.
Our results of the other three stressors—high debt ratio, low IGR, 
and low net income per capita—have results that do not support 
many of our hypothesized outcomes, but would support that 
managers do not see the threat of these stressors as compelling 
as the stressor of high unemployment. This lack of a stages-like 
approach by administrators indicates that other approaches are used, 
indicating a limitation of our study.
Our results focus on the stages approach for Florida county 
governments. Our focus on Florida Counties leads to an important 
limitation. According to Wen et al. (2020), city behavior in both 
revenue structure and economic functions differ from that of 
counties. However, there are unclear differences between counties by 
Table 6 Marginal Effects of Low Net Income Per Capita
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Spending Administrative Public Safety Physical Environment Human Services Transportation
One year of low net income per capita 0.068*** 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.110*** 0.025** 0.077***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
Two years 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.089*** 0.021** 0.060***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007)
Three years 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.068*** 0.018** 0.042***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009) (0.006)
Four years 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.019*** 0.046*** 0.014* 0.025***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
Five years 0.016** 0.012*** 0.010** 0.025 0.010 0.007
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014)
Observations 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < 0.01.
Figure 3 Cumulative Effect of Extended Periods of Low IGR
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Figure 4 Cumulative Effect of Extended Periods of Low Net 
Income Per Capita
state, although Moller, Alderson, and Nielsen (2009) indicate that 
socio-demographic measures vary by county, which impacts income 
inequality. Little research shows that county fiscal behavior varies 
by state, although some evidence is present for county variation 
in performance measures (Berman and Wang 2000; Wang and 
Berman 2001). We propose that researchers seek to understand 
county behavior variation across and by state.
We propose that further research into alternative methods to 
fiscal stress needs to be sought. Our outcomes lead to a need to 
operationalize new approaches to fiscal stress outside of the current 
literature on public administrators’ behavior. Further research 
is needed into understanding the political and administrative 
behaviors behind the differential reductions in different spending 
categories. This may be especially helpful by studying panels of 
spending data in states with different political environments, where 
spending priorities and revenue constraints may differ from Florida.
Note
1. In this study, we use a broad definition of fiscal stress to include 
conditions of increased revenue scarcity and/or escalated 
expenditure demands that significantly strain a government’s 
financial resources. The literature identifies fiscal stress as a 
function of fiscal condition. Many local government researchers 
note that many factors affect local government fiscal conditions, 
indicating that no single metric is all-encompassing of the many 
components of fiscal condition (Jacob and Hendrick 2012). 
Research has proposed that local decisions and the external 
environment affect fiscal condition (Groves, Nollenberger, and 
Valente 2003; Hendrick 2011; Honadle, Costa, and 
Cigler 2004). The result is that fiscal stress involves the 
government’s environment, its fiscal structure, and the balancing 
of fiscal structure and the environment (Hendrick 2004; 
Hendrick 2011). Fundamentally the adaptation to the 
environment is a key function of fiscal condition 
(Hendrick 2011). Broadly viewed, the environment may consist 
of factors that vary from the immediate availability of economic 
resources to the political culture within the government (Clark 
and Ferguson 1983). Chapman (2008) conjectures that when 
fiscal decisions and available resources are asymmetrical, fiscal 
stress ensues.
Table 7 Control Variable Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Log of real income per capita 0.797*** 0.946*** 1.523*** 0.569** −0.331 −0.145
(0.068) (0.135) (0.172) (0.271) (0.206) (0.125)
Log of intergovernmental revenue per capita 0.077*** −0.044 −0.110*** −0.213** −0.004 0.421***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.036) (0.104) (0.085) (0.068)
Log of tax burden −0.508*** −0.136*** −0.305*** −1.291*** −0.300* −0.457***
(0.040) (0.049) (0.072) (0.191) (0.157) (0.113)
High debt ratio
Log of real income per capita 0.872*** 0.970*** 1.577*** 0.456* −0.291 0.040
(0.064) (0.130) (0.164) (0.270) (0.218) (0.112)
Log of intergovernmental revenue per capita 0.103*** −0.028 −0.083** −0.263** 0.044 0.460***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.039) (0.108) (0.074) (0.069)
Log of tax burden −0.446*** −0.109** −0.267*** −1.388*** −0.261 −0.326***
(0.044) (0.049) (0.076) (0.201) (0.172) (0.112)
Low intergovernmental revenue
Log of real income per capita 0.906*** 1.056*** 1.656*** 0.340 −0.243 0.121
(0.064) (0.126) (0.165) (0.276) (0.202) (0.126)
Log of tax burden −0.510*** −0.117** −0.270*** −1.224*** −0.296* −0.585***
(0.041) (0.047) (0.069) (0.175) (0.152) (0.120)
Low net income per capita
Log of real income per capita 1.077*** 1.066*** 1.644*** 0.254 −0.314 0.053
(0.054) (0.123) (0.159) (0.265) (0.226) (0.115)
Log of intergovernmental revenue per capita 0.052*** −0.073** −0.127*** −0.299*** 0.033 0.406***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.038) (0.109) (0.073) (0.063)
Log of tax burden −0.650*** −0.254*** −0.378*** −1.617*** −0.320* −0.503***
(0.036) (0.050) (0.076) (0.212) (0.190) (0.119)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Appendix: GMM Results for Each Model
Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Spending Administrative Public Safety Physical Services Human Services Transportation
Lag of dependent variable 0.300*** 0.478*** 0.385*** 0.536*** 0.506*** 0.367***
(0.033) (0.042) (0.053) (0.041) (0.096) (0.044)
Count of consecutive years of 
high unemployment
−0.020*** −0.009 −0.013** 0.037* −0.007 −0.042***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.016) (0.012)
Count of consecutive years of 
high unemployment2
0.001* 0.001 0.001 −0.004 −0.003 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Log of real income per capita 0.797*** 0.946*** 1.523*** 0.569** −0.331 −0.145
(0.068) (0.135) (0.172) (0.271) (0.206) (0.125)
Log of intergovernmental 
revenue per capita
0.077*** −0.044 −0.110*** −0.213** −0.004 0.421***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.036) (0.104) (0.085) (0.068)
Log of tax burden −0.508*** −0.136*** −0.305*** −1.291*** −0.300* −0.457***
(0.040) (0.049) (0.072) (0.191) (0.157) (0.113)
Observations 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
Number of id 66 66 66 66 66 66
N 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
id 66 66 66 66 66 66
AR1 1.50e−10 9.16e−11 1.09e−07 1.51e−09 1.00e−06 0
AR2 0.749 0.0336 0.140 0.218 0.162 0.349
SARGAN 326.9 255.2 213.1 218.9 138.5 192.9
SARGAN-P 0 0 0 0 6.67e−07 0
HANSEN 65.25 65.39 64.65 63.87 60.37 64.21
HANSEN-p 0.538 0.533 0.559 0.586 0.704 0.574
difhansen 64.30 65.54 63.97 64.24 59.17 64.21
difhansenP 0.431 0.389 0.442 0.433 0.613 0.434
diff 0.951 −0.150 0.688 −0.362 1.199 −0.00476
diffp 0.917 1 0.953 1 0.878 1
# of Inst 73 73 73 73 73 73
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Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Spending Administrative Public Safety Physical Services Human Services Transportation
Lag of dependent variable 0.303*** 0.477*** 0.376*** 0.542*** 0.515*** 0.376***
(0.033) (0.043) (0.052) (0.040) (0.092) (0.045)
Count of consecutive years of 
debt ratio t
−0.015** −0.008 −0.010 0.013 −0.012 0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.028) (0.015) (0.012)
Count of consecutive years of 
debt ratio2
0.002** 0.001 0.002 −0.003 0.001 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Log of real income per capita 0.872*** 0.970*** 1.577*** 0.456* −0.291 0.040
(0.064) (0.130) (0.164) (0.270) (0.218) (0.112)
Log of intergovernmental 
revenue per capita
0.103*** −0.028 −0.083** −0.263** 0.044 0.460***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.039) (0.108) (0.074) (0.069)
Log of tax burden −0.446*** −0.109** −0.267*** −1.388*** −0.261 −0.326***
(0.044) (0.049) (0.076) (0.201) (0.172) (0.112)
Observations 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
Number of id 66 66 66 66 66 66
N 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
id 66 66 66 66 66 66
AR1 9.21e−11 6.23e−11 7.09e−08 9.40e-10 1.31e−06 0
AR2 0.707 0.0298 0.119 0.211 0.167 0.335
SARGAN 349.1 252.5 208.9 219.1 147.1 210.9
SARGAN-P 0 0 0 0 6.19e−08 0
HANSEN 65.37 65.64 65.23 64.11 58.72 65.01
HANSEN-p 0.534 0.524 0.538 0.577 0.755 0.546
difhansen 65.54 65.36 64.10 64.47 60.97 63.25
difhansenP 0.389 0.395 0.438 0.425 0.549 0.467
diff −0.167 0.282 1.131 −0.363 −2.251 1.760
diffp 1 0.991 0.889 1 1 0.780
# of Inst 73 73 73 73 73 73
IGR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Spending Administrative Public Safety Physical Services Human Services Transportation
Lag of dependent 
variable
0.291*** 0.473*** 0.366*** 0.558*** 0.511*** 0.358***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.053) (0.040) (0.092) (0.044)
Count of 
consecutive years of 
low IGR
−0.004 0.014*** 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.008
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.009) (0.006)
Count of 
consecutive years of 
low IGR2
0.000 −0.001** −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Log of real income 
per capita
0.906*** 1.056*** 1.656*** 0.340 −0.243 0.121
(0.064) (0.126) (0.165) (0.276) (0.202) (0.126)
Log of tax burden −0.510*** −0.117** −0.270*** −1.224*** −0.296* −0.585***
(0.041) (0.047) (0.069) (0.175) (0.152) (0.120)
Observations 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
Number of id 66 66 66 66 66 66
N 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
id 66 66 66 66 66 66
AR1 1.04e−10 8.25e−11 1.80e−07 1.80e−09 1.40e−06 0
AR2 0.834 0.0391 0.0653 0.193 0.174 0.565
SARGAN 399.3 238.8 190.6 223.4 141.2 265.8
SARGAN-P 0 0 0 0 3.19e−07 0
HANSEN 65.12 65.15 64.63 63.92 62.91 65.33
HANSEN-p 0.542 0.541 0.559 0.584 0.619 0.535
difhansen 64.69 65.50 64.69 64.75 61.38 65.54
difhansenP 0.452 0.424 0.452 0.450 0.570 0.423
diff 0.423 −0.358 −0.0552 −0.822 1.529 −0.209
diffp 0.935 1 1 1 0.675 1
# of Inst 72 72 72 72 72 72
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NET Income Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Spending Administrative Public Safety Physical Services Human Services Transportation
Lag of dependent 
variable
0.160*** 0.405*** 0.348*** 0.549*** 0.507*** 0.315***
(0.027) (0.041) (0.052) (0.039) (0.091) (0.045)
Count of 
consecutive years of 
low net income per 
capita
0.081*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.131*** 0.029** 0.095***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.014) (0.017)
Count of 
consecutive years of 
low net income per 
capita2
−0.007*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.011*** −0.002* −0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Log of real income 
per capita
1.077*** 1.066*** 1.644*** 0.254 −0.314 0.053




0.052*** −0.073** −0.127*** −0.299*** 0.033 0.406***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.038) (0.109) (0.073) (0.063)
Log of tax burden −0.650*** −0.254*** −0.378*** −1.617*** −0.320* −0.503***
(0.036) (0.050) (0.076) (0.212) (0.190) (0.119)
Observations 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
Number of id 66 66 66 66 66 66
N 2217 2217 2217 2212 2209 2214
id 66 66 66 66 66 66
AR1 2.72e−09 9.89e−11 4.42e−07 2.77e−09 9.98e−07 0
AR2 0.116 0.0995 0.0827 0.301 0.181 0.694
SARGAN 242.8 210.9 192.1 217.3 136.6 191.5
SARGAN-P 0 0 0 0 1.13e−06 0
HANSEN 64.24 64.75 63.20 64.47 62.86 63.03
HANSEN-p 0.573 0.555 0.609 0.565 0.621 0.615
difhansen 62.53 64.87 62.68 63.61 59.94 65.33
difhansenP 0.493 0.411 0.488 0.455 0.586 0.396
diff 1.711 −0.118 0.517 0.855 2.919 −2.300
diffp 0.789 1 0.972 0.931 0.571 1
# of Inst 73 73 73 73 73 73
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
